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I. INTRODUCTION
While most people agree upon the need for gender equity,
especially at our institutions of higher learning, its application to
women's collegiate athletics generates passionate responses from many
perspectives. Feminist activists view this issue as an opportunity to
advance women's equality and reverse past discrimination.' Others,
particularly football coaches, view gender equity as a potential threat
to the very existence of college football and to the future of all
intercollegiate athletics.2 Administrators, caught in the middle, see an
administrative nightmare as all sides demand shares of increasingly
limited resources.
3
Title IX,4 the law that prohibits sex discrimination in educational
institutions that receive federal money, was enacted in 1972. Even
* B.A. 1992, University of Washington; J.D. 1995, Seattle University. Note & Comment
Editor, Seattle University Law Review, 1994-95. The author wishes to thank Professors Kellye
Testy and Melinda Branscomb for their ideas and help in developing this Comment. In addition,
the author wishes to thank Andrea Vitalich, his Editor, and Bryan Smith, the Research and
Technical Editor assigned to his paper, along with the other law review members who helped
prepare this Comment for publication. Their hard work made the editing process easy and
productive.
1. See Christina Johnson, The Evolution of Title IX: Prospects for Equality in Intercollegiate
Athletics, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 759 (1981); Marianne Pogge-Strubing, The Sexist
Underground in Sports, 7 UPDATE ON LAW-RELATED EDUC. 16 (1983); Wendy Olson, Beyond
Title IX: Toward an Agenda for Women and Sports in the 1990's, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 105
(1991).
2. "(The) only thing gender equity needs to be very careful of-don't destroy the goose that
lays the golden egg." Interview with Bobby Bowden, Head Football Coach at Florida State
University, Battle of the Sexes (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 9, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CNN File.
3. Interview with Kit Green, Associate Athletic Director for Women's Sports at the
University of Washington, in Seattle, Wash. (October 10, 1993). Ms. Green has since retired
from her position with the University of Washington. The Author offers his sincere appreciation,
not only for her time and help with the background for this paper, but for her years of dedicated
service to his alma mater.
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
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though regulations governing Title IX's impact on athletics were
promulgated between 1975 and 1980,s litigation was limited through-
out the 1970's and 1980's because of court-imposed hurdles and a
dramatic increase in funding for women's athletics.
However, this debate has been moving from campuses to
courtrooms with increasing frequency. A spate of new cases has been
filed within the past two years.6 Courts are having to decide the
compliance status of universities, and to design remedies in cases where
violations exist. As courts examine this issue, key differences in the
way courts enforce the law emerge. If Title IX is to succeed in
creating an equitable distribution of opportunities without endangering
the health of athletics as a whole, courts should not place the interests
of individual plaintiffs above the interests of all athletes. Courts
should concentrate on solutions that look to the long term health of
athletics and the success of Title IX.
Part II of this Comment is a brief history of Title IX, from the
enacting legislation through the 1980's. Part III summarizes recent
decisions, identifying the issues courts are grappling with and what
lines, if any, are being drawn. In Part IV, analyzes three issues which
are repeatedly presented in recent cases. These issues are those upon
which the courts have disagreed, or which pose potential problems in
future litigation: 1) how should courts treat the tensions between the
individual plaintiffs and the class-oriented goals of Title IX; 2) how
much deference should school administrators be given when making
budget decisions; and 3) is it appropriate to award monetary damages
to successful plaintiffs?
This Comment concludes that the long term goals of Title IX, as
well as the overall success of college sports, are better served by
.treating all claims as class actions, by giving administrators more
deference than some courts have been willing to give, and by refusing
to grant monetary damages. In essence, courts need to promote long
term success rather than the short term goals of individuals.
5. 45 Fed. Reg. 30955 (1980).
6. Carol Herwig, Colgate Prevails in Title IX Appeal, USA TODAY, April 28, 1993, at 9C.
Eleven cases were filed between the springs of 1992 and 1993. Id. Also, at least one case not
filed at that time has been decided. Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. 11M.
1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
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II. BACKGROUND
Following hearings in 1970, Congress set about to stop sex
discrimination on college campuses.' That effort resulted in the
adoption of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972.8
Attempts in Congress to divest athletics from the scope of Title IX
failed.9
Once Title IX became law, regulations were promulgated to define
and enforce the requirements of gender equity. After the regulations
were finalized and enforcement began, women at various universities
began to use litigation as a tool to enforce their rights. This Part
briefly summarizes Title IX's evolution in order to set a context for the
examination of current trends.
A. The Requirement of Title IX
The thrust of Title IX is clear: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
benefits of, or be subjected to, discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."1 Certain
institutions are exempt from this law,1 but most universities fall
under the auspices of the statute.12
As a model for Title IX, Congress used Title VI's attempt to curb
racial discrimination in higher education. 3  However, there are
important differences between enforcing gender and racial equity in
education. Congress specifically defined Title IX's purpose as ensuring
equitable opportunities for both genders, not a forced mixing of the
genders. 14  The law, by focusing on opportunities for members of
both genders, allowed for the continuation of separate programs for the
7. See DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON EQUAL
RIGHTS IN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT, 3-261 (1973).
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
9. Richard M. Graf, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Adducing Congressional Intent, 24
B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1274-76 (1983).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
11. Parochial schools, 20 U.S.C § 1681(aX3), Military schools, id. § (aX4), and traditionally
single sex schools, id. § (a)(5), have each been excluded.
12. "For purposes of this title an educational institution means any public or private...
institution of vocational, professional, or higher education." Id. § 1681(c).
13. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979).
14. The law allows for the continuation of single sex schools. See supra note 11. See also
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1994), in which the Office Of Civil Rights specifically allows for separate
teams, and does not even require equal opportunity to compete in contact sports such as football.
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two genders."3 Thus, Title IX appears to apply the discredited racial
doctrine of "separate but equal" '16 to enforce gender equity.
B. Administrative Regulations
After passing Title IX, Congress transferred enforcement power
to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).17
Once jurisdiction was conferred to HEW, HEW promulgated rules
and standards governing investigations into institutional compliance on
a wide variety of issues, including athletics, and began to enforce these
standards in 1980.18 These regulations require that, while separate
teams may exist for men and women, women must be allowed to
participate on men's teams in non-contact sports if no women's team
is sponsored.19  The regulations further require that institutions
"provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes."2
The regulations list ten factors to use in determining whether the
requirement is satisfied.21
Of these ten, the first, accommodation of the interests and abilities
of both sexes, has been cited most frequently in recent Title IX
decisions.22 The HEW policy interpretation set out three questions
15. See supra note 11; 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1994).
16. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Supreme Court has not
extended the ruling ending racial segregation to gender segregation.
17. Subsequently, when HEW was divided into the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Department of Education, jurisdiction was transferred to the Department of
Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR). 20 U.S.C. §§ 3441, 3503 (1988). The Department
of Health and Human Services still claims jurisdiction and makes regulations governing athletic
programs, see 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1993), but courts universally have cited to the OCR regulations.
See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828-29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
18. 45 Fed. Reg. 30955 (1980).
19. Contact sports are exempt from this requirement. Contact sports are defined as those
which the purpose of or a major activity of is bodily contact. Specifically delineated as contact
sports are boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, and basketball. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)
(1994).
20. Id. § 106.41(c) (1994).
21. The factors include:
1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate
the interests and abilities of members of both sexes; 2) The provision of equipment and
supplies; 3) Scheduling of games and practice time; 4) Travel and per diem allowance;
5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; 6) Assignment and
compensation of coaches and tutors; 7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and
competitive facilities; 8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services; 9)
Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; and 10) Publicity.
Id.
22. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896 (1st Cir. 1993);
Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 741 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated and remanded, 992 F.2d
17 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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to be asked in determining compliance with this provision of the
regulations:
(1) whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male
and female students are provided in numbers substantially propor-
tionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) where the members of one sex have been and are under-
represented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution
can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion
which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and
abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) where the members of one sex are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it
can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of that sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.
23
If the answer to any of these questions is yes, the university is in
compliance. If the answer to all three questions is negative, then the
university is in violation of Title IX.24  Because some of this stan-
dard's terms are vague, the government attempted to provide some
guidance in the investigator's manual of the Office of Civil Rights
(OCR).25  For example, the manual notes that "there is no set ratio
that constitutes 'substantially proportionate' or that, when not met,
results in a disparity or a violation. ' 26  However, the manual does
suggest that the ratio of male to female athletes should be as close as
possible to the overall ratio of male to female students." Courts have
also provided some guidance by holding that disparities of 10.5%28
and 11.6%29 are unacceptable.
These regulations have held up under attack for fifteen years.
After the regulations were promulgated, the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) filed suit to have them thrown out.30
The courts rejected the NCAA's arguments, firmly acknowledging the
jurisdiction of the HEW and the power of the HEW to formulate
regulations governing conduct.31
23. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828-29 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979)).
24. See id. at 829.
25. See id. at 828.
26. Id. at 829-30 (quoting OFFICE FOR CIvIL RIGHTs, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL 24 (1990)).
27. Id. at 830.
28. Id.
29. See Cohen, 809 F. Supp at 991.
30. NCAA v. Califano, 444 F. Supp 425, 428 (1978).
31. See id.
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Since then, courts have routinely stated that they give "great
deference" to the standards developed in the regulations.32 Even
though the regulations were meant for administrative review rather
than as a legal test, recent court decisions have uniformly applied the
standards of the HEW and the OCR.33 This has been the case even
when the court in question has stated that the regulations are in
conflict with the plain meaning of the initial legislation or require
results which were not Congress' intent.34
C. Judicial Interpretations of Title IX 1979-1989
Once HEW developed regulations, the government began
investigating university actions.3" In addition, women athletes began
taking their universities to court seeking redress for violations.36
These cases raised a series of questions, the most predominant of
which were: 1) was there an implied right of action in Title IX; 2)
what programs were under the control of Title IX; and 3) what relief
was appropriate in Title IX cases? The answers to these three
questions governed the scope and effectiveness of Title IX litigation
throughout the 1980's.
1. Implied right of action
In many early Title IX cases, defendant institutions tried to have
cases dismissed by claiming that individual students could not sue
under Title IX. The universities argued that the law did not give
students the right to sue. They argued that the law mandated
conditions for receiving federal funding, not legal rights that could be
enforced by a court.
Initially, courts were divided on this issue.37 However, in
32. See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828 (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144 (1991)); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron has been adopted by courts in Title IX
cases. See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895; Favia v. Indiana Univ., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584 (W.D.
Pa 1993).
33. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895; Favia, 812 F. Supp at 584; Cook,
802 F. Supp at 741.
34. Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp 237, 241 (C.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265
(7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
35. See Pogge-Sturbing, supra note 1, at 19.
36. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 796-99.
37. See Strong v. Demopolis City Bd. of Educ., 515 F. Supp. 730, 736 (S.D. Ala. 1981)
(holding that Title IX did confer a private right of action); See also Leake v. University of
Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255, 259-60 (6th Cir. 1979) (ruling against a professor who claimed
employment discrimination, but ruling that a student would have a right of private action), But
see Cape v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 424 F. Supp 732, 738 (E.D. Tenn. 1976)
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Cannon v. University of Chicago,3" the Supreme Court settled the
question by ruling that, since the legislation was designed to protect
female athletes, the athletes could sue to uphold their rights. This
defense has not been presented in any of the modem cases.
2. Scope of Title IX
A more successful argument that universities used in Title IX
litigation was that Title IX was limited to those programs which
received direct federal funding. Because athletic departments did not
receive direct federal assistance, the universities argued that it was
improper to apply Title IX to sports. Many courts agreed with the
schools and threw out cases on this basis.39 Other courts held that
the university could spend more money on athletic programs because
of the aid other programs received, and that this indirect benefit
triggered application of Title IX standards.4°
In Grove City College v. Bell,41 the Supreme Court ruled that the
scope of Title IX was limited to those programs which received direct
funding from the federal government. This ruling undercut the power
of Title IX in reforming athletics. The OCR dropped dozens of
investigations because of this limiting rule.42 As a result of Grove
City, those cases still in the judicial system were dismissed or put on
hold.43
In response to Grove City and other Supreme Court decisions that
limited the scope of various civil rights legislation, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.44 For purposes of Title IX,
Congress specifically defined an institution receiving federal funds to
include all programs at that institution whether directly benefited or
not.45
(holding that students did not enjoy a right of private action), rev'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 793
(6th Cir. 1977).
38. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
39. Hillsdale College v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir.
1982), vacated, 466 U.S. 901 (1984); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 613 F. Supp. 1360
(E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986); Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., 525
F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 903
(1984).
40. See, e.g., Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987), amended, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 761.
41. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
42. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894 n.5. The OCR dropped 79 ongoing investigations because of
the Grove City decision.
43. See, e.g., Haffer, 678 F. Supp at 521.
44. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
45. Id. § 1687(4).
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
With the passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act, enforcement
of Title IX moved forward. For example, Haffer v. Temple Universi-
ty,46 which was put on hold when the Grove City decision was handed
down, was revived in 1987. The court refused to dismiss the claim or
to rule summarily in favor of Temple.4' Instead, the court ruled that
Haffer would likely prevail if the facts supported the plaintiffs
version. Subsequently, Temple settled the complaint out of court
and this case became the model for future litigation.49
3. Available relief in private actions
In cases where Title IX violations were shown, courts were left
with the question of the relief to be granted. Courts were reluctant to
impose sweeping remedies. For instance, although courts were willing
to award injunctive relief to plaintiffs in private actions, 0 courts were
less likely to award monetary damages. In Lieberman v. University of
Chicago,"1 the court held that Title IX did not allow for monetary
compensation because Congress did not include such a remedial option
in the statute. Additionally, in Cannon v. University of Health
Sciences/Chicago Medical School, 2 the court refused to consider
compensatory damages even where the defendant had failed to mitigate
the injury to the plaintiff.
Courts rarely granted monetary damages. For instance, in 1986,
a federal district court awarded damages for an intentional violation of
Title IX. 3 However, this approach was not utilized by any higher
court in any other 1980's case.
III. PRESENT DOCTRINE
With the passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
came a renewed call for gender equity in women's athletics and
46. 678 F. Supp. at 517.
47. Id. at 541-42.
48. Id. at 541.
49. Christina A. Longo and Elizabeth P. Thonan, A Reawakening of Gender Discrimination
in Intercollegiate Athletics, 16 J.C. & U.L. 137 (1987).
50. See, e.g., Lip'ett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). But see
Organization of Minority Vendors, Inc. v. Illinois C.G.R.R., 579 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. IUI. 1983)
(holding that injunctive relief was not available in private actions to enforce anti-discrimination
laws unless the plaintiff has first sought relief through the administrative process).
51. 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982).
52. 710 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1983).
53. Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Pa. 1986), affd, Beehler v. Lehman, 989 F.2d
486 (3rd Cir. 1993).
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stronger enforcement of the rights created under Title IX. 4 Since
1987, litigation in this area has increased. In fact, many suits have
been filed within the past two years.55 While the majority of cases in
this new wave are still in the initial stages, some have been resolved.
Although fact-specific, these recent decisions are useful in identifying
the central legal and policy issues that other courts will have to face.
In Cook v. Colgate University,56 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals was faced with a traditional Title IX question: whether a
university should be forced to increase funding for women's athletics?
Members of the women's field hockey club sued after the university
repeatedly denied them varsity status.5 7 The plaintiffs claimed that
Colgate illegally denied them varsity status because the men's hockey
team had varsity status and received significantly more funding as a
result of that status.5" The women claimed that the university was in
violation of Title IX requirements for failing to provide proportional
gender opportunities.59
Colgate asserted several defenses. The university argued that it
was inappropriate to compare teams of one sport rather than to
evaluate the entire program.6" Additionally, Colgate argued that they
deserved the flexibility to make decisions in a responsible manner and
an opportunity to develop a plan that would improve the situation.61
Finally, the university pointed out that the budget for the overall
program was limited and that the university should be allowed to close
the gap by cutting men's programs rather than being forced to increase
women's programs in a tight budgetary period.62
The district court ruled for the plaintiffs. 63 The court deter-
mined compliance by comparing the two hockey programs, although
the court noted that even an evaluation of the entire program would
have gone against the university.' The court held that the university
54. See P. Michael Villalobos, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987: Revitalization of
Title IX, 1 MARQUETrE SPORTS L. J. 149 (Sept. 22, 1990).
55. See supra note 6.
56. 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
57. Id. at 18 (varsity status had been denied in 1979, 1983, 1986 and 1988).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.; Cook v. Colgate University, 802 F. Supp. 737, 742 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated and
remanded, 992 F.2d 17 (2nd Cir. 1993).
61. 992 F.2d 17.
62. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 749-50.
63. Id. at 751.
64. Id. at 742.
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could not ignore the gender equity issue by claiming poverty,65 and
that Title IX required the university to increase women's opportunities
until equity existed.66
The appellate court reversed on the grounds that the action was
moot.67 Because the plaintiffs had all graduated or would graduate
before the next season began,6 injunctive relief would no longer help
them. The court did not address the merits of the district court's
decision.
A different question was presented in Favia v. Indiana Universi-
ty.69 Rather than women demanding an expansion of their program,
this case concerned university attempts to curtail some opportunities
women already enjoyed. 70 IUP wanted to eliminate women's gymnas-
tics and field hockey and men's soccer and tennis as a way to lower the
athletic department's budget. 7' The plaintiffs, representing all present
and future female students who might wish to participate in the two
programs, argued that the move would violate Title IX because women
were already underrepresented in the program. Prior to the budget
cuts, women had 37.7% of the athletic opportunities, but comprised a
majority of the student body as a whole.72 These cuts aggravated the
gender disparity in the athletic department by lowering the percentage
of women athletes to 36.5%.73
The university argued that they had a good history of expanding
women's programs since the inception of Title IX74 and would
therefore pass the second prong of the accommodation test.7' The
university further argued that eliminating two men's and two women's
programs simultaneously was fair, and thus not in violation of Title
IX.76 The university believed that because eliminating two programs
from each gender was, in itself, an equitable decision, past discrimina-
tion should be deemed irrelevant. 77 In essence, the university asked
for a clean slate.
65. Id. at 750 (citing Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1987),
amended, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 761).
66. Id.
67. Cook, 992 F.2d at 17.
68. Id. at 19.
69. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
70. Id. at 579.
71. Id. at 580.
72. Id. at 581.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 585.
75. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
76. 812 F. Supp. at 580.
77. Id.
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However, the court held that, because the university was not in
current compliance with Title IX standards, the university must take
action to remedy its past discriminatory effects on women's athlet-
ics.78 Further, the court rejected IUP's argument that its decision to
cut two programs of each gender should be allowed as the university
could not ignore its present problems when making decisions for the
future.79 Finally, the court rejected the university's claim of poverty
as an excuse for its failure to solve the inequities of the twenty years
since the inception of Title IX. 0
Soon after Favia was decided, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a similar decision in Cohen v. Brown University."1 Cohen
represented a class consisting of all present and future female athletes
at Brown who were interested in participating in intercollegiate
athletics.8 2 The named plaintiffs were members of the women's
gymnastics and volleyball teams.8 3 As a cost cutting measure, the
university decided to cut the two women's programs along with two
men's programs, golf and water polo. 4
Like the plaintiffs in Favia, Cohen argued that women had
suffered from past discriminatory practices by the university 5 and
that the current cutbacks were illegal because the women's programs
to be eliminated made up a larger percentage of women's opportunities
than did the targeted men's programs.8 6
The university responded by claiming that the makeup of the
student body as a whole was the wrong standard to use in evaluating
an athletic department.8 7 Rather, the university argued that opportu-
nity, not participation, was the proper standard. 8 Absent statistics
showing that they violated this standard, the university argued that
they should not be held in violation of Title IX for cutting the two
men's and two women's programs.8 9
The trial court rejected the university's argument. Pointing to the
language of the OCR's policy interpretation, the court found that the
78. Id. at 584-85.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 585.
81. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), affg 809 F. Supp. 978 (D. R.I. 1992).
82. 809 F. Supp. at 979.
83. Id.
84. 991 F.2d at 892.
85. 809 F. Supp. at 985-86.
86. Id. at 986.
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law required opportunities proportional to the makeup of the student
body.90 Thus, the court concluded that Brown violated Title IX and
should not be allowed to cut these programs. The court specifically
held that a university found to be in violation could design a program
that did not include the specific sports named in the suit, but only if
this program satisfied the requirements of Title IX.9'
In Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture,92 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals was also faced with a case involving budget
cutbacks, but procedural and factual differences raised new issues and
led the court to a different analysis.93 The most striking factual
difference between Roberts and the circumstances of Favia and Cohen
is that the proposed cuts did close the gender gap.
Because the softball program would lose eighteen positions, while
the elimination of the baseball program would lower men's opportuni-
ties by fifty-five slots,94 the University argued that the reductions
should be allowed under Title IX. In addition, the university argued
that to bar this budget plan would unduly hinder its ability to
administer the program in a responsible manner.9 The women
countered that, as the underrepresented gender, any cut to their
programs would be a violation of Title IX.96
As a result, the court did not fashion the remedy in such a way
as to protect or benefit the largest amount of women, but rather it had
to focus on the needs of the individual plaintiffs.97
The district court found that the university had a history of being
in violation of Title IX,98 that this proposed cut would lower the
overall number of women's opportunities," and that Title IX did not
allow for such reduction. 1°° The court stated that the effect that
cutting the softball team had on gender equity should be scrutinized
on its own, and not along with the cutting of baseball.'0 ' The
90. 991 F.2d at 899.
91. 809 F. Supp. at 1001; 991 F.2d at 906.
92. 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), affg 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
580 (1993).
93. Unlike Favia or Cohen, this case was not filed as a class action, but was filed on behalf
of the current softball players only.
94. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D. Colo.), affd, 998
F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
95. 998 F.2d at 833.
96. 814 F. Supp. at 1514.
97. 998 F.2d at 833.
98. 814 F. Supp. at 1512.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1514.
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district court further held that the university would have to restart the
softball program as a competitive team. 102 The court of appeals
upheld the decision except that it vacated the district court's order
requiring that such program be top flight.
10 3
Recently, in Kelley v. University of Illinois,'°4 the district court
addressed the issue of reverse discrimination under Title IX. The
university eliminated its men's swimming program as part of a cost-
cutting measure.'05 In response, the members of the team sued to
retain the team. The men based their claim on the fact that the
university had left the women's swimming program intact.0° The
men argued that this prevented them from swimming for the university
based solely on their gender in violation of Title IX. 07
The university argued that the team was cut in order to bring the
department into line with Title IX.' °8 Because of the influence of
football, the lack of a women's football program, and the school's
budgetary constraints the only way to achieve overall equity was to
offer women opportunities which were denied to men."°  Thus, a
discriminatory impact on an individual sport was not only allowable,
but necessary to achieve overall equality. 0
The court agreed with the university."' Although the court
acknowledged that this result was not intended by Title IX, the
regulations accompanying the law required overall equity even if it
meant reverse discrimination."' The court attacked the regulations
as possibly going against the plain meaning of the enabling legisla-
tion," 3 but left the rules intact.
While other cases are progressing through the system," 4 the
preceding cases provide a cross-section of some of the major issues
facing the courts, and of the different solutions these courts have used.
102. Id. at 1507.
103. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 834-35.
104. 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 264 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 938 (1995).
105. Id. at 239.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 240, 242. In addition, the Big Ten Conference, of which Illinois is a member
institution, mandated overall department proportionality. Id. at 240.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 242.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 243.
113. Id. at 241.
114. See, e.g., Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
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IV. BALANCING INTERESTS IN TITLE IX LITIGATION
Although recent cases vary factually, certain central questions have
surfaced in many of them. These questions, and how courts resolve
them, will have more of an impact on the future of Title IX than any
individual ruling. This Part discusses three of these central issues:
class status, apportioning budgetary cutbacks, and compensatory
damages.
A. Class Status
Suits filed against universities for Title IX enforcement rarely deal
with a single plaintiff. Rather, these cases are usually attempts to force
universities to offer more and better opportunities for women athletes
in general. As a result, most cases are filed as class actions, represent-
ing all potential female athletes at an institution, present and fu-
ture.115
However, not all cases have been class actions. In some cases, the
plaintiffs have sought to protect only their individual interests." 6
These cases present the additional problem of balancing an individual's
(or small group's) grievances with the overall intent.
Unfortunately, recent courts have tended to focus on the needs
and interests of individual plaintiffs to the detriment of long term
goals. Recent decisions have not advanced the cause of gender equity
as well as decisions in class action cases would have. This has led to
undue intervention in athletic departments, and could result in an
inefficient use of judicial resources. In order to ensure that the long-
term interests of Title IX, women athletes, and universities are
advanced, courts need to view all Title IX cases as class actions
whenever possible, especially when fashioning remedies.
When courts do not treat cases as class actions, they place the
interests of the named plaintiffs above those of female athletes as a
group. This can result in rulings that provide relief for the named
plaintiffs, but ignore the overall problems and do not ensure better
treatment of women athletes in the future. For example, in Cook v.
Colgate University,"7 the district court ruled that Colgate was in
violation of Title IX and issued an injunction forcing the school to
fund a varsity women's field hockey team. However, the appellate
115. Six of the eleven cases filed between the springs of 1992 and 1993 were class actions.
See Herwig, supra note 6, at 9C.
116. See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 824; Cook, 992 F.2d at 17.
117. 802 F. Supp. at 751.
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court vacated the judgment, not because of the merits of the case, but
because the graduation of the named plaintiffs had rendered the claim
moot."' Had this been a class action case, future female field hockey
players would have been under the protection of the injunction.
Instead, future players will have to repeat the process.
While Title IX was written to protect women from discrimination,
the intent was to affect the opportunities of all women." 9  By
sacrificing the interests of future female athletes for their own, these
plaintiffs are misusing the leverage Title IX has created. By allowing
them to do so, the courts risk undermining the potential of Title IX to
ensure equitable distribution of resources.
Universities can also be unduly injured by a lack of class status.
In Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture,'2" the court agreed
with the university that the department should be allowed flexibility in
designing a program that achieves gender equity, but left in place the
district court injunction requiring CSU to field a softball team.'
The court felt compelled to require specific changes in the department,
not because such changes were necessarily the best method.of gaining
compliance, but because the lack of class status required a remedy
tailored to the needs of the individual softball players who were
plaintiffs in the case.'
Yet another adverse consequence of not having class status is a
potential waste of judicial resources. When the current players
graduate from CSU, new athletes may have to initiate a suit in order
to maintain the injunction. If future field hockey players at Colgate
wish varsity status, they may have to take the university to court again.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel will not necessarily apply. In Cook,
for instance, the initial injunction was vacated,' meaning there was
never a final decision on the merits. Rearguing these questions is not
an efficient use of judicial resources.
While plaintiffs certainly have the right to bring actions to address
their individual grievances, courts should take into account the goals
of Title IX and the legitimate interests of the universities and other
female athletes by presumptively treating all Title IX litigation as an
action to benefit the class. Only in rare circumstances would class
118. Cook, 992 F.2d at 20.
119. See generally Graf, supra note 9.
120. 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
121. Id. at 835.
122. Id. at 833.
123. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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status be inappropriate, and plaintiffs should have the burden of
showing why it should not be applied in their case.
B. Gender Equity in Tight Budgetary Times
When Title IX was written, and the regulations promulgated,
most related actions were expected to involve women seeking expansion
of women's programs to equal the men's programs.124 However,
economic realities have transformed this area of the law. Now, many
cases involve efforts by universities to cut back programs and questions
of how much of the burden women's programs should bear."2 ' A
proper balance between the need to achieve gender equity and the need
to maintain healthy athletic programs is necessary to ensure the long
term success of Title IX without threatening the health of intercolle-
giate athletics as a whole.
Plaintiffs argue that, because they already suffer from discrimina-
tion, universities should not be allowed to inflict more harm on
them.1 26 They argue that schools could achieve better gender equity
and more reasonable budgets by cutting men's programs such as
football. Universities, on the other hand, point to the rapid increase
in funding for women's athletics to show that many steps have been
made. 1 27 The universities argue that, in order to maintain a healthy
program, they must be allowed a certain amount of deference to make
tough decisions. They argue that women's programs should not be
immune to the consequences of shrinking budgets so long as gender
equity is an important factor in making budgetary decisions.
1 21
If a university were to try to achieve a better financial outlook by
eliminating only women's programs, when the women were under-
represented to begin with, there would be little debate about the
illegality or unfairness of such a move. However, these recent cases
have dealt with attempts to balance the pain of budget cutbacks
between the genders. These cases are more difficult to label as fair or
unfair, and the legal decisions are consequently more complicated and
controversial.
124. See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX,
9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1992).
125. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 824; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 888; Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 237;
Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 578.
126. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1507; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 985-87 (D.R.I. 1992), affd,
991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
127. See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991.
128. See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 1000.
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Even so, some cases have been easy to interpret. Both Cohen v.
Brown University29 and Favia v. Indiana University3 ' involve ef-
forts to worsen the gender gap in the name of fiscal responsibility.
The courts were adamant that, where one gender is underrepresented,
the university may not apportion the bulk of the cutbacks to that
gender's programs. These two cases are examples of what Title IX can
accomplish when properly applied. As the court in Cohen noted,
universities can comply with Title IX by any method they choose so
long as such compliance takes place.1 3
1
However, some cases have gone beyond this rule when enforcing
Title IX. In Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture,'32 for
instance, the court cited the rule from Cohen that the university could
achieve gender equity by cutting men's programs while leaving
women's programs intact or while cutting women's programs at a
slower rate. 133 However, the court then ruled that CSU could not
cut the women's softball team in conjunction with the men's baseball
team even though the bulk of the cuts fell on the men's program. 34
And in Kelley v. University of Illinois,3' the court stated in dicta that
it could have prevented the university from disbanding the women's
diving team along with the men's swimming team if the move had
been challenged, 136 despite the fact that the men's swimming team
had twenty-eight members while the women's diving team had only
one.137  Thus, the court sided with the Roberts court by denying
universities the right to close the gender gap by cutting women's
programs at a slower rate than men's programs.131
The district court in Cook v. Colgate University139 went even
further, requiring the university to add a women's program while it
was cutting men's programs, despite the effort of the university to
leave all existing women's programs intact.14 The appellate court
129. 991 F.2d at 888.
130. 812 F. Supp. at 578.
131. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898-99 n.15.
132. 998 F.2d at 824.
133. Id. at 830 (citing Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898-99 n.15).
134. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1514.
135. 832 F. Supp. at 237.
136. Id. at 242.
137. Id. at 239.
138. Id. at 242.
139. 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
140. Id. at 751.
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reversed on technical grounds, but did not strike down the merits of
the case.141
While no one should be proud of the way in which women
athletes have been treated in the past by athletic departments, courts
need to be careful to make decisions based on the future, not on past
discriminatory policies. As long as a university uses gender equity as
an important factor, the final policy should be left up to those
administrators who are in the best position to evaluate the needs of the
department. Going as far as the court in Roberts prevents those who
must worry about the health of an entire program from functioning
properly.
C. Compensatory Damages
As mentioned above, 142 the traditional rule in Title IX cases has
been to deny monetary damages while granting injunctive relief.
Because the law's scope was limited to those institutions receiving
federal funds, the rights created under Title IX were not judged to
warrant an award of damages when those rights were denied.143
Rather, the stick most courts used in forcing compliance was the threat
of cutting off federal funds to the institution.' The courts should
continue to follow this doctrine because, especially in tight budgetary
times, granting compensatory damages will only restrict the opportuni-
ties of future athletes of both genders.
The rule against compensatory damages has remained largely
intact, with the exceptions to this rule remaining limited. For instance,
the exception to the rule found in Beehler v. Jeffes,45 that damages
could be awarded in cases of intentional violation of Title IX, is still
restricted. The requirement of willfulness makes this remedy more
akin to punitive damages rather than consequential ones. Few athletic
departments need to worry about this exception because most modem
cases involve good faith efforts to run the program rather than malice
toward the plaintiffs.
Another exception to the rule which has developed involves
damage awards in employment discrimination suits,146 but this
exception is also limited in its application to collegiate funding cases.
141. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
142. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 52-53.
144. See supra note 51.
145. 664 F. Supp. 931, 940 (M.D. Pa. 1986), affd, Beehler v. Lehman, 989 F.2d 486 (3rd
Cir. 1993).
146. See Paddio v. Board of Trustees, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 86 (E.D. La. 1993).
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Because employment discrimination suits have traditionally awarded
monetary damages, the court in Paddio ruled, in part, that the plaintiff
should not have to give up that remedy simply because the statute
upon which she based her claim, in part, does not call for compensa-
tion to the plaintiff.'47 Because unequal funding cases have not
traditionally involved a monetary remedy, 48 athletic departments
have little to fear from this exception.
While these exceptions appear to be a sensible effort to balance
the goals of Title IX with protecting and compensating injured parties
in the most egregious cases, there is a danger if courts go too far.
While no court has awarded damages in a simple disproportionality
case, such as those listed in Part III, damages can be awarded to
successful plaintiffs.'49 If courts begin to award monetary damages,
especially in cases of universities cutting back programs for financial
reasons, the health of the overall program will be threatened.
There is a good argument to be made for awarding damages in
these cases. The plaintiffs in these cases often can lose a season of
competition, or at least several months of training, while the case goes
to court. For example, if the plaintiffs in Cohen are not able to have
official practices with paid coaches prior to the court decision, their
gymnastics performance will be harmed and a case can be made that
they deserve compensation for their injury.
However, Roberts shows that courts are willing to issue sweeping
preliminary injunctions should the need arise to prevent such injuries.
The potential harm of monetary damages outweighs the need for them
as a policy matter. If a court awards a large amount of money to a
small group of athletes, already strapped programs will be forced to
offer even fewer opportunities overall. Indeed, monetary damages
could do enough harm to programs to outweigh the good which Title
IX has achieved.50
V. CONCLUSION
Title IX has greatly advanced women's intercollegiate athletics.
Between 1972 and 1990, expenditures for women's athletics rose from
almost nothing to millions of dollars annually at most institutions. s'
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 52-53.
149. See Franklin v. Gwinett County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). While this
case was a sexual harassment claim, the court did not limit the decision. Id. at 1030.
150. Interview with Kit Green, Associate Athletic Director for the University of
Washington in Seattle, Wash. (October 10, 1993).
151. See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d 888; Roberts, 998 F.2d 824.
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There is still much to do because most schools are still budgeting in
a discriminatory manner to some degree. But schools have been
moving in the right direction.
Ironically, as women's programs are being funded at record levels,
Title IX cases are being filed more frequently. While women athletes
certainly deserve equal opportunities to compete, these cases, and some
of the rules being adopted by courts, pose a potential threat to the
health of intercollegiate athletics as a whole. This is particularly true
if the courts disregard the practical aspects of their rulings. Courts
need to be careful to balance gender equity with pragmatism.
First, courts need to view Title IX cases as class actions wherever
possible. Class actions are most likely to achieve long term benefits for
women while also giving universities the most flexibility in designing
a solution. Without class status, the court must remedy only the
problems of the individual parties, ignoring the needs of future
potential plaintiffs. A lack of class status will also burden institutions
by forcing them to design a solution to fit the needs of the individuals
regardless of whether that solution will benefit the most women.
Finally, a lack of class status increases the likelihood that future cases
will need to be filed.
Second, courts need to avoid placing gender equity on a higher
priority than the health of the entire athletic program. Especially in
cases where universities are trying to cut back funding, the court
should allow the institution to balance the pain. So long as the
university takes gender equity into consideration, the courts should
allow cuts to be made in a sensible fashion. Specifically, the courts
should allow universities to cut women's programs when they are
cutting men's programs at a significantly faster rate, as the university
attempted to do in Roberts.
Thirdly, the courts should avoid the temptation to award
monetary damages in most Title IX actions. While a woman who is
prevented from competing in her sport because opportunities are not
equal certainly suffers and may deserve to be compensated, the
problems outweigh the benefits. By awarding damages, a court would
be placing the needs of the few plaintiffs above the needs of the
athletes to come.
For the most part, Title IX has worked to advance the opportuni-
ties for women athletes. The threat of court action plays an important
role in this process. Provided that courts keep the goals of Title IX
and the long term effects of their decisions in mind, this process can
continue to benefit women and bring about a more equitable situation
that will benefit all. However, if the courts ignore the long term
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consequences and the original goals, and instead narrowly focus on the
particular complaint of a particular plaintiff, the courts will run the risk
of doing more harm than good and threatening the overall health of
intercollegiate athletics.
